Entities

Entities collected from this article, grouped for quick reference and copying. Inclusion does not establish malicious activity. Article links appear separately at the bottom as references.

NovaCookies is a phishing service rentable for US$320 a month, or US$200 for 14 days. And for the price, it does something most people still believe MFA is supposed to prevent. It can walk away with an already authenticated Microsoft 365 session after you successfully complete the log-in yourself.

The trick is not novel, but it definitely matters. The password is not the most valuable thing NovaCookies steals. The session is. When you log in to Microsoft 365, the system hands your browser a cookie. The token essentially says this person already proved who they are, so let them work.

NovaCookies sits in the middle of the authentication flow, relays the real log-in in real time, and captures the authenticated session once it is issued. Your password, your MFA prompt, your approval, all of it happens exactly as designed. The threat actor does not need to defeat the second factor afterward, because it holds the finished authenticated session.

Think about what this changes. MFA is the one control most organizations treat as the finish line. Turn it on and you are safe. That has been the simplified message for years.

NovaCookies is built around the assumption authentication itself is no longer the end of the problem. It does not need to break the lock. It gets between you and the door while you legitimately unlock it, then takes the proof the door is already open.

This is not some elite bespoke operation. It is advertised as a subscription. US$320 a month buys access to a maintained phishing service, with domains, hosting, Microsoft or Google-branded redirect options, an admin panel, and support presented as product features. There is even a US$200 tier for 14 days.

Building and maintaining an adversary-in-the-middle relay takes real skill. Renting the capability dramatically lowers the barrier. This sounds eerily like the early days of ransomware-as-a-service, crude early tooling put in the hands of people who could never build it themselves. The actual danger here is not the technique, which is known. It is the economics. Specialist capability is being packaged and sold like software.

The delivery is the clever part. One of the strongest infection chains Island observed starts inside a genuine DocuSign envelope. The notification originates from infrastructure the recipient already recognizes, and the envelope opens in the legitimate DocuSign viewer. However, the document inside is counterfeit. From there, some campaigns route the victim through genuine Microsoft or Google sign-in endpoints before reaching adversary-controlled infrastructure. By the time your browser arrives at the malicious destination, several earlier parts of the journey really were legitimate. The con works because trust is borrowed from genuine services before it is transferred to the threat actor.

Another detail matters. The Microsoft redirect trick does not require Microsoft itself to be compromised. NovaCookies uses an OAuth error-redirect technique, where an adversary-controlled application is configured with an adversary-controlled redirect URI. The journey can begin on login.microsoftonline.com and still end somewhere the adversary controls. Microsoft and DocuSign were not breached to make this work. Their legitimate services were used as pieces of the delivery chain.

The scale is already real, although “targeted” is the important word here, because Island does not claim every target was successfully compromised. Researchers found hundreds of organizations across the US, UK, Canada, Germany, Israel, and the UAE, and published 755 domains assessed as dedicated malicious infrastructure.

Of the organizations in the reviewed dataset, 49.2 percent were US-based or US-associated, and nearly 90 percent were associated with lures hosted on .vu domains. Low-volume infrastructure existed in late 2025, registrations accelerated sharply in mid-May 2026, peaked in June, and new infrastructure was still appearing in August. This is not one phishing page. It is an operating platform with disposable infrastructure.

NovaCookies is not interesting because adversary-in-the-middle phishing is some novel technique. It is not. What makes NovaCookies interesting is the industrialization. Domains, hosting, redirects, evasion, session capture, and support are being bundled behind one price. The innovation is increasingly in distribution and accessibility, not in inventing an entirely new attack technique.

The anti-analysis side makes the same point. Island observed short-lived context binding, proof-of-work checks, browser inspection, and other runtime controls designed to make automated analysis harder. None of those techniques makes the infrastructure invisible, and Island explicitly describes it as scanner-resistant rather than scanner-proof. But packaged together, they give a potential buyer capabilities once requiring considerably more operational work.

If you thought MFA closed this chapter, you are unfortunately mistaken. It did not. It raised the bar, exactly as it was supposed to, and the eCrime ecosystem moved to the next layer. Once passwords protected by a second factor became harder to reuse, authenticated sessions became a much more valuable target.

The distinction matters because not all MFA is equally exposed to this technique. Phishing-resistant authentication, such as properly deployed FIDO2 and WebAuthn, is specifically designed to resist the sort of credential relay conventional adversary-in-the-middle phishing depends on. The lesson is not MFA failing, because it definitely did not fail. The lesson is “we have MFA” no longer being a sufficiently precise description of an identity security strategy.

MFA is still absolutely worth having. It eliminates enormous amounts of low-effort credential abuse. But organizations need to stop treating successful authentication as the end of the conversation. Identity security now has to protect what happens before the log-in, during the log-in, and after the log-in, the same lesson SLIM SPIDER taught in the cloud.

The thing worth stealing is no longer necessarily the password. Increasingly, it is the proof you already successfully logged in. The threat actors adapted, the market packaged the adaptation, and the security model now has to move again.