Three countdown clocks began running on the n0n dedicated leak site (DLS) on November 16, Reuters reports. JPMorgan Chase, Visa, and Mastercard each sat behind one, their names paired with a 48-hour payment deadline. When the clocks reached zero, the extortion threat actor marked all three as having refused to pay and opened the files beneath their names for anyone to download.
The JPMorgan files held more than 16,000 purported customer email addresses, some with phone numbers and postal codes, beside 124 addresses appearing to belong to bank employees, a Reuters review found. Visa spreadsheets carried marketing campaigns for cardholders across Hong Kong, Taiwan, Korea, and Japan. A third set held Mastercard records spanning North America, the Middle East, and Africa. Reuters reviewed the files but could not authenticate them.
All three companies confirmed incidents at outside providers, yet none has named the firm involved or publicly attributed the intrusion to n0n. Reuters calls JPMorgan the largest lender in the United States, and the bank and two of the biggest card networks keep cardholder marketing and benefit data with vendors the public cannot identify. Names, contact details, and card program membership are what a convincing phishing message needs, and every authentic record in those spreadsheets makes its owner easier to deceive this week than last.
Operation Timeline
Trace the events, turning points, and connections behind the analysis.
n0n Card Vendor Timeline
Key events from the exposed n0n workspace in September 2026 to the vendor disclosures on November 19, 2026.
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September 25 to 26, 2026
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October 5, 2026
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October 12, 2026
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October 14 to 26, 2026
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October 16, 2026
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October 19, 2026
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October 22, 2026
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November 16, 2026
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November 19, 2026
What Each Company Confirmed
JPMorgan said in a post on X on November 19 that third parties providing services to the bank had been the target of a cyber attack. The bank believes the intruders accessed "certain marketing data held by those vendors, which may include some customer names and email addresses." JPMorgan will contact affected customers where appropriate and offer complimentary credit monitoring. SecurityWeek saw the n0n dedicated leak site with all three companies marked as not having paid.
Visa told Reuters the claims are "associated with an incident involving a third-party service provider in Asia Pacific," and no payments data such as card numbers was affected. Reuters found the posted Visa spreadsheets focus on Asian-Pacific markets, Malaysia, Australia, and Macau among them. The files hold thousands of purported customer email addresses and phone numbers alongside Visa marketing campaign data.
Mastercard told Reuters an outside firm had exposed "a limited amount of email addresses" belonging to "a small subset of cardholders enrolled in a specific benefit program," with no impact on the payment network. Cyber Security News adds the exposure has been contained and the card network is working with the vendor to support affected cardholders. Reuters found the posted Mastercard files also include a small number of staff addresses.
The file structure supplies the strongest public evidence for a common provider. Cybernews researcher Aras Nazarovas found similar files and formatting across the JPMorgan, Visa, and Mastercard sets and said they look "taken from the same third party." The same review found the roughly 2,000 Mastercard entries poorly formatted and likely test data. The shared formatting strengthens the common-provider reading, while the likely test data weakens any assumption every row is a real cardholder.
American Banker tied the JPMorgan records to J.P. Morgan Reserve cardholders. Newsweek reports the Reserve program is an invitation-only Visa credit card usually requiring at least US$10 million in assets under management. n0n described the JPMorgan set as cardmember engagement records holding "hundreds of thousands of campaign interactions for tens of thousands of distinct cardmember email addresses." JPMorgan declined to comment on the posted data.
Nobody has said how many customers were affected or explained how the intruders got in. Whether one vendor or several sits behind the three disclosures is still unanswered.
Inside the n0n Workspace
SOCRadar found an exposed staging server in September 2026 holding the live workspace of a threat actor tied to n0n. The open directory at 185.157.161[.]148 held 1,719 files, including 829 scripts and five encryptor sources. Every documented compromise relied on weak or stolen logins, with no vulnerability exploited. Entry points ranged from credential stuffing against 305 FortiGate virtual private network (VPN) appliances to exposed Amazon Web Services (AWS) keys and weak Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) passwords.
The threat actor built tools with OpenCode, an open-source artificial intelligence (AI) coding agent, configured with 154 model entries across seven providers, uncensored models included. Spending on large language model access passed US$7,216 by October 22, 2026, and SOCRadar describes a human-directed campaign supported by AI. A recovered workspace sets n0n apart from TITAN's unverified 700GB-an-hour claim, which was marketing. Where n0n does not encrypt, the threat actor destroys data and backups after stealing them.
Wiz traced a campaign from October 14 to 26, 2026 in which a threat actor used credentials from an AWS account tied to Qubole, a cloud data platform, to assume roles customers had created to trust the vendor. Wiz then noted press accounts of an actor calling itself n0n claiming the intrusion, since tied to the Expedia breach, but did not verify the claim. Sentra says dozens of Qubole customers were impacted.
On October 12, n0n listed 38 maritime, port, and logistics organizations across 18 countries in one batch. SOCRadar notes researchers linked at least 21 of them to customers of CyberLogitec, a South Korean shipping software provider, though the company has not confirmed an incident. In another case n0n emailed PayPal's security team about a breach at a contact center provider serving the payments firm, pressing the client to pressure the vendor.
CYFIRMA found n0n has posted anonymized "Company #" entries since October 5, describing only sector and location, then named the victim after the deadline. Reuters says eCrime.ch counts roughly 200 incidents claimed since September 2026. SOCRadar counts 93 listed victims and US$283.7 million in demands as of October 19, and a check of 55 ransom addresses three days earlier found zero transactions.
The countdown follows the public pressure model behind the Revolut extortion, and the evidence problem matches The Gentlemen's unverified listings. A clock and a company name create pressure before anyone has verified a single row. The three payments brands faced that pressure for the length of the countdown with no sample authenticated.
Marketing Data Becomes Targeting Data
A card issuer can invalidate a stolen card number within days. A list of names, contact details, and the card program each person holds lasts far longer, and the payments brands themselves supply the pretext. A message about a concierge booking, a benefit renewal, or a breach notice reads as routine to a customer expecting exactly those emails. Cyber Security News advises customers to verify any unexpected breach notice through the bank's app or the number on the card, never through a link.
If authentic, the 124 staff addresses Reuters found in the JPMorgan files carry a different risk. Employee addresses give a threat actor a ready list of targets at the bank, and a phishing message referencing a real customer campaign would carry convincing insider detail. The Chainalysis breach showed names, email addresses, and role labels turning a generic lure into targeted spear-phishing. Neither JPMorgan nor Mastercard has said what roles the exposed employees hold.
n0n is financially motivated, yet downloadable data serves more than one buyer. An authentic dataset of Visa cardholders across East Asia and of J.P. Morgan Reserve cardholders would be collection material for any state service building target lists of wealthy or well-connected people. Nothing public shows a state service has taken the files. Once published, they no longer need to be stolen twice.
JPMorgan stressed the vendor breach had nothing to do with a processing outage earlier in the week, which the bank traced to a software bug, and the Associated Press reports the two incidents were unrelated. Afterward, Reuters reports, the United States Department of the Treasury and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) called banks minutes after the disruption surfaced to confirm the problem was contained and not cyber related. A vendor breach claim arriving days later reaches regulators already asking questions.
Attribution Rests on Reporting Alone
Security Affairs calls n0n a Russian extortion threat actor. SOCRadar, which examined the threat actor's own workspace, says the files provide no definitive geographic or national attribution. The September staging server sat with a hosting provider in Sweden, which says nothing about where its user lives. The Russian label rests on reporting, not on evidence in the public record.
Wiz judged the Qubole targeting opportunistic, with data theft not matching typical state-backed priorities, an assessment bearing on n0n only if the n0n claim is accurate. SOCRadar independently found each n0n victim gets a unique Bitcoin (BTC) address, with demands from 0.5BTC to 33BTC and a 10 percent upfront fee to open a negotiation room. Those details point to profit. n0n keeps listing victims while collecting nothing visible.
Zero transactions across 55 addresses do not prove nobody paid. n0n could have switched wallets during negotiation, accepted another cryptocurrency, used an intermediary, or settled outside the addresses SOCRadar collected. SOCRadar checked only those 55 addresses, which held no visible transactions on October 16, and CYFIRMA records one listed company marked as settled.
SOCRadar assesses the exposed workspace likely belonged to one person or a small team inside a broader enterprise run by several people. That fits one workspace covering 23 organizations while the n0n brand claimed roughly 200 incidents, a count Reuters says eCrime.ch keeps. The evidence does not establish a ransomware-as-a-service structure, an affiliate program, or the sale of initial access. It shows extortion infrastructure able to handle many victims at once.
One Vendor or Several
The three companies describe outside firms holding marketing, campaign, and card benefit data, and each says its own systems were untouched. Three hypotheses fit the evidence.
Hypothesis 1, A Shared Cardholder Services Provider
A single firm running cardholder marketing or benefit programs for several card brands was breached, and n0n split the take by client. Visa names a provider in Asia Pacific and Mastercard a benefit program. Newsweek notes the J.P. Morgan Reserve card is itself a Visa card, and Cybernews found matching file structures across the three sets. Against it, the Mastercard data covers other regions and may be test data, and JPMorgan speaks of vendors in the plural.
Hypothesis 2, Several Vendors Listed Together
n0n reached several unrelated vendors through the credential stuffing and exposed key pipeline SOCRadar documented, then listed the financial clients together for effect. The regional split between the Visa and Mastercard data fits separate providers, and the Chase post speaks of third parties in the plural. Against it, similar formatting across the three posted sets points toward a common source, although n0n could also have batched unrelated claims for maximum attention.
Hypothesis 3, A Shared Cloud Data Platform
A cloud data platform used by the marketing vendors gave a threat actor trusted access the way Qubole roles did in the campaign n0n claimed. CYFIRMA lists a marketing analytics software vendor and a cloud hosting provider among n0n entries from late September, the kind of upstream firms holding engagement records. Against this reading, Wiz has tied no card brand to the Qubole intrusions and has not verified the n0n claim, and each company insists its own environment was not involved.
Responsibility Does Not Leave the Bank
The companies' statements establish vendor-side exposure of marketing and card benefit data. Reuters and Cybernews found files published under the n0n name, and SecurityWeek saw them on the leak page, but none of that shows n0n carried out each underlying intrusion. SOCRadar documents reliance on weak or stolen credentials, while the Qubole trusted-access campaign remains a claim rather than a verified attribution.
I assess with moderate confidence the three disclosures trace to firms handling cardholder marketing or benefit programs. I assess with low confidence they share a single vendor, given the similar file structures against the split geography, the questionable Mastercard records, and the plural wording from JPMorgan. A named provider, a disclosure from a benefits vendor, or a fourth card brand on the dedicated leak site would raise or settle the second judgment.
Financial regulators have already written the rule these disclosures test. The 2023 interagency guidance on third-party relationships from the Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the OCC says outsourcing "does not diminish or remove" a banking organization's responsibility to operate safely and within the law. Reuters reports Carissa Robb of SolomonEdwards saying customers do not distinguish between a bank and its vendor, and companies should scrutinize how much data they share at all.
Organizations sharing customer data with outside firms can act on what this case already shows. Inventory every vendor holding customer records and cut each data share to what the task requires. Revoke vendor roles, keys, and accounts the day a contract ends, the lesson the abandoned Qubole trust at Expedia taught. The forgotten Barracuda cloud key and the stolen AI vendor credentials at Uber show vendor access reaching customer data the same way.
Replace standing cloud keys with short-term credentials, and put phishing-resistant multifactor authentication, which the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) calls the gold standard, on every remote access gateway and portal. Invalidate credentials found in infostealer logs. Write breach notification deadlines and the right to audit into every vendor contract.
Watch extortion sites for anonymized listings before a name appears, and tell customers now how genuine messages will reach them, through the app or the number on the card. By the companies' accounts, the threat actor never needed their core systems. Their customer relationships were already stored somewhere else, and the threat actor went there.
Analyst Annex
Evidence status as of November 20, 2026. The records cover the November 16 n0n claims against JPMorgan Chase, Visa, and Mastercard, the files reviewed by Reuters and Cybernews, and the November 19 disclosures by the three companies. The separate SOCRadar workspace research and Qubole campaign provide tradecraft context only. No company has named a provider, disclosed an entry point, or connected the card-vendor incidents to the infrastructure and procedures in those separate investigations.
Confirmed marks evidence published by a victim, vendor, regulator, or government authority about its own systems, decisions, or investigation. Reported marks technical findings or attribution assessments published by a third party. Claimed marks statements by a seller or self-identified threat actor that remain unverified. Provisional marks an analytical mapping supported by evidence but not made by the original source.
Indicators
No public indicator has been tied to the card-vendor incidents. The table caps the most useful records from the separate n0n workspace and Qubole investigations. Shared VPN exit addresses and the Qubole platform account, both carrying legitimate traffic, are left out. The complete n0n set is available in the SOCRadar repository, and Wiz publishes the complete Qubole set in its campaign report.
| Indicator | Context | Status |
|---|---|---|
| IP Addresses | ||
185.157.161[.]148:8877 | Python HTTP file server exposing the live n0n workspace on September 25 and 26, 2026Source: SOCRadar | Reported |
188.214.135[.]130 | Dedicated leak site backend holding victim records, wallet tooling, automation, and command-and-control listenersSource: SOCRadar | Reported |
81.161.239[.]10 | Loot vault receiving exfiltrated data and hosting leak-builder and command-and-control functionsSource: SOCRadar | Reported |
57.129.54[.]120 | OVH server behind most observed Qubole campaign activity from October 15, 2026Source: Wiz | Reported |
| Other Indicators | ||
notice@n0n-cases[.]net | Sender address used for direct extortion notices and pressure messagesSource: SOCRadar | Reported |
APBSID=n0n | Cookie value placed in FortiGate SSL-VPN credential-stuffing requestsSource: SOCRadar | Reported |
AIDA3W7DIFLYOLTK63SFS | Amazon Web Services identity Wiz observed only in activity attributed to the Qubole campaign threat actorSource: Wiz | Reported |
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
The public record does not disclose enough procedure detail to map the card-vendor incidents. The table covers only activity documented in the separate n0n workspace and Qubole investigations.
| Tactic | Technique | Procedure | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| n0n Workspace Activity, September 10 to 28, 2026 | |||
| Reconnaissance | T1595.001Active Scanning: Scanning IP Blocks | Scanned Remote Desktop Protocol targets and maintained a ranked list of 305 FortiGate SSL-VPN appliancesSource: SOCRadar | Reported |
| Initial Access | T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts | Used exposed long-lived Amazon Web Services identity and access management keysSource: SOCRadar | Reported |
| Persistence | T1136.001Create Account: Local Account | Created hidden local administrator accounts including svc_upd and svc_reg with non-expiring passwordsSource: SOCRadar | Reported |
| Credential Access | T1110.004Brute Force: Credential Stuffing | Ran a 15-thread credential-stuffing routine against FortiGate SSL-VPN appliances through residential proxiesSource: SOCRadar | Reported |
| Collection | T1530Data from Cloud Storage | Pulled data from Amazon S3 buckets under per-bucket collection limitsSource: SOCRadar | Reported |
| Impact | T1486Data Encrypted for Impact | Used Windows and Linux n0n locker variants and an OpenSSL stage against Cisco Firepower Management Center appliancesSource: SOCRadar | Reported |
| Impact | T1490Inhibit System Recovery | Deleted volume shadow copies and wiped free space before encryptionSource: SOCRadar | Reported |
| Qubole Cross-Account Campaign, October 14 to 26, 2026 | |||
| Initial Access | T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts | Used identities from an Amazon Web Services account associated with Qubole to assume customer integration rolesSource: Wiz | Provisional |
| Collection | T1530Data from Cloud Storage | Enumerated Amazon S3 buckets and downloaded accessible objects through assumed integration rolesSource: Wiz | Provisional |
Entities
| Entity | Role | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Threat Actors | ||
| n0neCrime extortion threat actor | Claimed and published the JPMorgan Chase, Visa, and Mastercard datasets and operates a data-theft and destructive-extortion enterprise with no definitive geographic attributionSource: SOCRadar, Reuters | Reported |
| Organizations and Victims | ||
| JPMorgan ChaseBank and vendor customer | Says intruders accessed marketing data held by service providers and may have obtained customer names and email addressesSource: JPMorgan Chase | Confirmed |
| VisaCard network and vendor customer | Says the claims are associated with an incident at a third-party service provider in Asia Pacific and no payment data was affectedSource: Reuters | Confirmed |
| MastercardCard network and vendor customer | Says an incident at a third-party provider exposed a limited number of email addresses from a small subset of cardholders in a benefit programSource: Reuters | Confirmed |
| Unnamed Service ProvidersThird-party marketing or benefit providers | Held the customer data exposed in the three company disclosures, but no public record identifies whether one provider or several were involvedSource: Reuters | Confirmed |
| Tools and Services | ||
| n0n LockerWindows and Linux encryptor | Recovered as source code from the exposed workspace and used with external wrapper scripts for execution and impactSource: SOCRadar | Reported |
| OpenCodeOpen-source AI coding agent | Configured with 154 model entries across seven providers and used to build and revise attack scripts in the n0n workspaceSource: SOCRadar | Reported |
| TruffleHogCredential discovery and validation tool | Validated Amazon Web Services, Entra ID, and Okta credentials found during the separate Qubole campaignSource: Wiz | Reported |
| QuboleCloud data platform | An associated Amazon Web Services account supplied identities used to assume customer integration roles in a separate campaign later claimed by n0nSource: Wiz | Reported |
| Amazon Web ServicesCloud platform | Hosted the integration roles, cloud identities, secrets, and storage targeted in the separate Qubole campaignSource: Wiz | Reported |
| FortiGate SSL-VPNRemote access service | Targeted by a credential-stuffing routine covering 305 appliances in the separate n0n workspace corpusSource: SOCRadar | Reported |
Related Activity
The table covers separate n0n and vendor-access activity, and none of its infrastructure, identities, tools, or access methods was observed in the card-vendor incidents unless explicitly stated.
| Item | Detail | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Exposed n0n WorkspaceTechnical Corpus, September 10 to 28, 2026 | SOCRadar captured 1,719 files from a live workspace linking n0n to credential attacks, encryption, destruction, exfiltration, and human-directed AI assistanceSource: SOCRadar | Reported |
| Qubole Cross-Account CampaignCloud Campaign, October 14 to 26, 2026 | A threat actor used identities associated with Qubole to assume customer roles, enumerate cloud resources, collect secrets, and download Amazon S3 dataSource: Wiz | Reported |
| n0n Qubole Attribution ClaimAttribution Claim, November 11, 2026 | An actor calling itself n0n claimed the Qubole campaign, but Wiz found no tie to other public activity and did not verify the claimSource: Wiz | Claimed |
| Expedia Vendor IncidentThird-Party Incident, November 2026 | Expedia says a compromised third-party data platform provider supplied access to its environment, while the public record does not connect that access to the card-vendor incidentsSource: jark.me | Confirmed |
| Maritime BatchDedicated Leak Site Claims, October 12, 2026 | n0n listed 38 maritime, port, and logistics organizations across 18 countries, with at least 21 linked by researchers to CyberLogitec customers but no confirmed supplier incidentSource: CYFIRMA, SOCRadar | Claimed |
| Transcom and PayPal PressureThird-Party Extortion Pressure, 2026 | n0n sent a secondary alert to PayPal security even though the compromised data remained on the contact-center provider's networkSource: SOCRadar | Reported |
Intelligence Gaps
| Gap | Why It Matters | What Would Close It |
|---|---|---|
| Provider Identity | Determines whether one compromise explains all three disclosures or several providers failed independently | A provider disclosure, a company filing naming the vendor, or authenticated file metadata identifying the originating environment |
| Initial Access | Controls whether the n0n credential pattern or Qubole trusted-role precedent applies to these incidents | Vendor forensic findings covering the first malicious authentication, exploited service, and credential source |
| Dataset Authenticity | Reuters reviewed the files but could not authenticate them, and Cybernews assessed some Mastercard rows as likely test data | Company validation, notification records, or independent comparison with authoritative customer records |
| Common Source | Similar file structures support a shared provider while split geography and JPMorgan's plural wording support several providers | Matching database schemas, export metadata, tenant identifiers, or a provider disclosure spanning the three brands |
| Affected Population | Posted rows can contain duplicates, test data, employees, and campaign interactions rather than unique affected customers | Company notification counts or a deduplicated and authenticated dataset analysis |
| n0n Intrusion Role | Publication under the n0n name does not prove the threat actor conducted each underlying intrusion | Negotiation records, victim-side telemetry matching n0n infrastructure, or law enforcement findings |
| Geographic Attribution | A Russian label appears in reporting while the recovered workspace supplies no definitive national or geographic evidence | Infrastructure ownership, identity records, financial tracing, or law enforcement attribution connecting the threat actor to a location |