Entities

Entities collected from this article, grouped for quick reference and copying. Inclusion does not establish malicious activity. Article links appear separately at the bottom as references.

The face on the screen folded at its edges, a second face laid over the first. Its owner kept his mouth below the frame for the whole call, and the distortion grew plainer each time the researchers asked him to lean back. He called himself Edward and said he ran The Great House, a builder in Lynchburg, Virginia. Asked to hold a hand in front of his face, Edward feigned confusion and cut the video.

Silent Push found a North Korean remote worker behind The Great House. The domain thegreathouse[.]us was registered on October 18, 2025, with devtop0109[@]gmail[.]com, an address on a leaked list of 1,400 accounts attributed to North Korean information technology (IT) workers. The site claims more than 10 years in business, more than 200 clients, and more than 60,000 square feet built.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) warned in June 2022 of deepfakes and stolen identities used to apply for remote jobs. North Korean IT workers have built fake companies around their job applications for years. The Great House points the same toolkit at a different buyer, selling construction and engineering contracts straight to property owners. Silent Push notes construction is a sector where North Korean remote workers are not typically noticed.

The front exists to win large construction and engineering projects and generate revenue for the North Korean regime, according to the research. The United States Department of the Treasury puts the IT worker schemes' contribution to North Korea's weapons of mass destruction programs at nearly US$800 million in 2024. A property owner signing with The Great House would be paying into those programs while believing a local builder won the job.

Operation Timeline

Trace the events, turning points, and connections behind the analysis.

The Great House Timeline

Key events from the 2022 United States guidance on North Korean IT workers to the exposure of The Great House on November 19, 2026.

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  1. May 16, 2022

    Federal Guidance Recommends Video Interviews

    United States

    The Department of State, Treasury, and the FBI say North Korean IT workers favor text-based chat instead of video calls and tell companies to conduct video interviews to verify identity.

  2. June 28, 2022

    FBI Warns of Deepfake Job Applicants

    United States

    The FBI warns of deepfakes used to apply for remote work, with lip movement not completely coordinating with the audio.

  3. January 23, 2025

    FBI Warns of IT Worker Extortion

    United States

    The FBI says North Korean IT workers discovered on networks held stolen data and code hostage.

  4. April 24, 2025

    Silent Push Exposes Three Front Companies

    Global

    BlockNovas LLC, Angeloper Agency, and SoftGlide LLC use synthetic employee images to lure developers.

  5. June 30, 2025

    Microsoft Reports Face Swapping

    Global

    Microsoft says North Korean IT workers use Faceswap on stolen identity documents and suspends 3,000 accounts.

  6. June 30, 2025

    Department of Justice Searches Laptop Farms

    United States

    Searches of 29 known or suspected laptop farms across 16 states.

  7. July 24, 2025

    Treasury Sanctions an IT Worker Network

    United States

    Treasury says North Korea withholds most of the wages earned by IT workers, generating hundreds of millions of dollars.

  8. August 19, 2025

    Leaked IT Worker Emails Republished

    Global

    The Raven File publishes the leaked list of addresses attributed to North Korean IT workers.

  9. October 18, 2025

    Front Domain Registered

    Lynchburg

    The domain thegreathouse[.]us is created for The Great House.

  10. October 22, 2025

    Eleven-State Monitoring Team Reports on IT Workers

    Global

    Eleven states release a report on North Korean cyber and IT worker activities after Russia vetoed the United Nations Panel of Experts.

  11. November 4, 2025

    Treasury Describes Revenue Splitting

    United States

    Treasury says North Korean IT workers partner with non-North Korean freelancers and split the revenue.

  12. March 12, 2026

    Treasury Puts 2024 Revenue Near US$800 Million

    United States

    Treasury says the IT worker schemes generated nearly US$800 million in 2024.

  13. November 19, 2026

    Silent Push Exposes The Great House

    Lynchburg

    Silent Push publishes its two calls with Edward, who used real-time deepfake software and declined to hold a hand in front of his face.

A Lynchburg Builder Registered From a Leaked List

Silent Push lists the services the site sells, from design and build and project management to remodeling, renovation, preconstruction, and interiors. The front claims commercial, residential, interiors, industrial, and healthcare projects across the United States. The listed team covers architecture, structural engineering, and mechanical, electrical, and plumbing (MEP) systems. Every claim sits on a domain about 13 months old when the research was published, and the site still serves the same content.

Telephone numbers on the site and in its registration point to Virginia, Arkansas, and Massachusetts. The contact page displays (434) 261-0111, a Lynchburg area code. The tel: link behind that number in the page markup dials +1 479-410-0717, an Arkansas line. The domain registration adds +1 351-345-0257, a Massachusetts area code, and a New York street address instead of a Virginia one. Silent Push notes legitimate local businesses rarely list numbers from three different states.

The site's email address is james[@]thegreathouse[.]us, while the man on both calls used the name Edward. The front also lists a LinkedIn company page and the Telegram account thegreathouse19, the channel the researchers used to reach Edward and set up the first meeting. A client meeting a contractor only through Telegram never sees an office, a yard, or workers on a site.

Silent Push traced the list to a researcher posting as SttyK, who shared 1,400 email addresses said to belong to North Korean IT workers through a file-sharing link since taken down. A second researcher, Rakeshkrishs12, republished the full list on The Raven File on August 19, 2025. A Full WHOIS registrant search on devtop0109[@]gmail[.]com returned thegreathouse[.]us and no other domain.

The front went live about two months after the list was republished. Whoever registered the domain either never checked whether the address was already burned or did not care. The research does not say whether the address appears in any account beyond the one domain registration.

Two Calls and the Hand Test

Edward kept his camera off for the entire first meeting, about 25 minutes long. Silent Push, posing as a prospective client, condensed the recording to 8 minutes and 47 seconds and published both calls. Edward showed interest in the project until the researchers said they needed to verify his identity. He resisted, then offered to switch on his camera for a second meeting as a compromise.

Layering artifacts and facial distortion, a different face laid over Edward's own, appeared almost as soon as his camera came on in the second call, Silent Push found. Edward kept his mouth out of frame, likely because the software could not keep his lips in sync with his voice. Leaning back on request made the flaws easier to see. He declined the raised hand, feigned confusion, and cut the feed. The researchers concluded he knew the deepfake had been caught.

Lip sync has betrayed deepfake candidates since at least 2022. The FBI warning of June 2022 described interviews where lip movement and on-camera actions did not completely coordinate with the audio of the person speaking. Edward's software still could not close the gap, so he kept his mouth out of the shot. The raised hand Edward refused is, in Silent Push's words, a common technique for detecting real-time facial manipulation.

United States guidance has told employers to rely on video since 2022. The May 16, 2022 advisory from the United States Department of State, Treasury, and the FBI said North Korean IT workers favor intermediaries and text-based chat over video calls. The advisory told companies hiring through freelance platforms to interview on camera to verify identity. Microsoft's June 2025 guidance still advises video calls to confirm a worker's identity. Edward followed the 2022 profile until pressed, then beat the camera with software.

Silent Push published both recordings, so the threat actors behind Edward can now see which request broke the persona. The next front can switch to software able to render a hand across the face, or refuse video entirely. Silent Push now advises asking for a raised hand, a turned head, or a lean back, watching for blurred edges and lips out of sync, and treating a refusal as a red flag.

A Revenue Line for the Munitions Industry

Treasury says North Korea's government withholds most of the wages its IT workers earn, generating hundreds of millions of dollars for weapons programs, in a designation of July 24, 2025. The March 2026 sanctions named Yun Song Guk, a North Korean national leading IT workers doing freelance work from Boten, Laos, since at least 2023. The 2022 advisory names the 313 General Bureau of the Munitions Industry Department among the entities dispatching the workers.

North Korean IT workers partner with non-North Korean freelancers on projects first commissioned to those outsiders and split the revenue, according to Treasury's November 4, 2025 action. A construction front could take the deposit, subcontract the building to a real local firm, and keep the margin. Silent Push documented a Discord recruiter offering United States, European Union, and Latin American citizens 35 percent of a salary to act as the face on job applications, with the North Korean worker keeping the rest.

Individual workers can earn more than US$300,000 a year in some cases, and teams more than US$3 million, the 2022 advisory says. An IT worker abroad earns at least ten times more than a North Korean laborer on an overseas construction project. The Great House reverses that comparison, selling construction from a keyboard without anyone setting foot on a site.

Eleven states formed the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team (MSMT) after Russia's veto in March 2024 disbanded the United Nations Panel of Experts watching North Korea. The MSMT released a report on North Korean cyber and IT worker activities on October 22, 2025. The United Nations Security Council body tracking North Korean revenue schemes no longer exists to record a front like this one.

A client paying The Great House risks sanctions exposure. Treasury's advisory warns anyone supporting North Korean IT worker activity, including processing related financial transactions, of potential legal consequences. Those range from civil penalties to criminal prosecution. Money reaching North Korea rarely comes back, as the US$3 billion North Korea still holds from the Binance theft shows.

In January 2025 the FBI warned North Korean IT workers discovered on company networks had extorted victims by holding stolen data and code hostage. A contractor in possession of a client's drawings and site schedules could make the same threat.

Contagious Interview Tradecraft Moves to Construction

Silent Push ties The Great House to Contagious Interview, which the vendor calls a Lazarus subgroup also tracked as FAMOUS CHOLLIMA and WageMole. CrowdStrike tracks the adversary as FAMOUS CHOLLIMA (aka Jasper Sleet), active since at least 2018, and assesses the threat actor likely acts for North Korea's Munitions Industry Department. That department funds and oversees the missile and nuclear weapons program.

FAMOUS CHOLLIMA runs fake technical interviews against programmers, as set out in the analysis of North Korean developer phishing, and has poisoned open-source packages through rigged coding tests. The Binance theft of US$6.34 billion began the same way, with a live video call with a human resources representative and then a poisoned coding assignment. North Korean recruiters also target the engineers building Europe's drones with fake job offers.

In April 2025 Silent Push exposed three cryptocurrency consulting fronts for Contagious Interview, BlockNovas LLC, Angeloper Agency, and SoftGlide LLC. Their staff pages used synthetic faces, some made with Remaker AI, a web service offering face swaps and artificial intelligence (AI) portraits built from selfies. Those fronts lured developers into fake job interviews and delivered BeaverTail, InvisibleFerret, and OtterCookie malware. The Great House keeps the corporate facade and drops the malware.

Microsoft says North Korean remote IT workers have used AI since 2024 to scale up their schemes. The workers run Faceswap, a free and open-source deepfake tool, to move their own pictures onto stolen identity documents, and experiment with voice-changing software. Microsoft suspended 3,000 consumer accounts created by these workers.

Silent Push's June 2025 analysis of five years of logs from infected machines pushed the campaign's start back to 2020. The logs exposed AI face-swap tools, headshot generators, and a vendor selling counterfeit passports and driver's licenses. Microsoft describes the scheme as historically focused on United States firms in technology, critical manufacturing, and transportation.

Shell companies with websites already carry the hiring side of the scheme. The United States Department of Justice announced searches of 29 known or suspected laptop farms on June 30, 2025. The searches covered 16 states. Defendants in one case built front businesses with websites, Hopana Tech LLC, Tony WKJ LLC, and Independent Lab LLC, to make overseas workers look tied to American employers. The Great House cuts out the employer and bills the client directly.

What the Evidence Does Not Prove

The attribution rests on two pieces of evidence, the deepfake and one registrant email from a list SttyK posted and Rakeshkrishs12 republished. Silent Push does not say how the list itself was verified. A shared email can also mean infrastructure passed between North Korean units, as the earlier developer phishing analysis noted, so the registrant alone does not say which unit runs the front.

Federal prosecutors charged three men over a scheme stealing more than US$129 million with synthetic voices or images on calls impersonating company chiefs, as covered in the analysis of deepfake executive fraud. None of the three is alleged to be North Korean. Faceswap costs nothing, and public tools give any threat actor deniability, since a borrowed tool carries no mark of who used it. A live deepfake does not identify North Korea.

Genuine stolen footage still overwhelmingly supports the North Korean scheme despite emerging deepfake use, the FBI says. A synthetic face on a client call is either a new capability spreading through the scheme or the mark of a weaker team. Silent Push found Edward failed the first test he faced.

Silent Push's research also promotes its own Traffic Origin product, sold for geolocating web visitors. The findings are specific and checkable, from the registrant search to the three phone numbers. The vendor's wording, "can confidently assess," attaches no stated level of certainty to the North Korean attribution.

Who Runs The Great House

Silent Push assesses the domain is operated by a North Korean remote worker, based on the registrant email and the deepfake. The research covers a single front company and two calls and names no client, payment, or bid. Three hypotheses fit the evidence.

Hypothesis 1, A FAMOUS CHOLLIMA Revenue Front

The front is one more FAMOUS CHOLLIMA revenue source, moved into a market where buyers do not expect it. The registrant email on the leaked list, the fake corporate identity, the contradictory contact details, and the stated revenue motive all match the adversary's known tradecraft. Against it, the list is third-party, the link is one email address, and the research reports no infrastructure shared with earlier fronts.

Hypothesis 2, A Fraudster Using North Korean Tradecraft

A non-North Korean fraudster runs the front, using a deepfake the way the executive impersonators did, and either reused an address from the public list or chose one to look North Korean. Contractor fraud pays through deposits on projects never built. Against it, the address registered only this domain, a fraudster planting a false flag would need to know the list, and the front's structure closely matches earlier North Korean fronts.

Hypothesis 3, Access Rather Than Revenue

The front seeks access to construction and engineering clients for collection, not payment. Lynchburg hosts the corporate headquarters of BWX Technologies (BWXT) and the base of the company's Nuclear Operations Group, part of the government business. Construction bids carry site plans, drawings, schedules, and site access, and a state adversary would value all four around a nuclear contractor.

Against Hypothesis 3, Silent Push says the front exists to generate revenue, no malware is delivered, and nothing in the evidence shows a bid near a sensitive site. The registration points to New York, not Virginia. Lynchburg may have been chosen for no reason beyond sounding like a real American town.

A Front Built for Buyers Who Never Ask

Silent Push's evidence establishes a fake builder with phone numbers in Virginia, Arkansas, and Massachusetts, a registrant email on a list of North Korean IT worker addresses, and a man using a live deepfake to win a client's trust. Treasury's sanctions actions establish the motive, a revenue line worth hundreds of millions of dollars a year to the weapons programs. The evidence does not establish a client, a payment, or a bid.

The evidence leans toward Hypothesis 1, since the email match and the front-company structure point most directly to North Korea. Hypothesis 3 cannot be excluded, because a front built for revenue still collects whatever clients hand over. I assess with moderate confidence The Great House is a North Korean IT worker revenue front consistent with FAMOUS CHOLLIMA (aka Jasper Sleet). Infrastructure shared with an earlier front, or payments traced to known North Korean laundering accounts, would raise the assessment to high.

A client report of a deposit taken without any work would shift weight toward Hypothesis 2. A bid tied to a sensitive site, or a request for drawings beyond what a quote needs, would shift weight toward Hypothesis 3. Either would change what the front is for, without changing the danger to the buyer.

Edward lost his cover to one analyst asking for a hand in front of a face. Most construction buyers would never ask, and most would accept a video call as proof a contractor exists. North Korea has spent four years learning to pass the checks written for software hiring and now sells to industries never told to look.

Any organization hiring a contractor, vendor, or remote worker never met in person can shut out a front like The Great House at no cost. Get the license number and verify it with the state contractor board, never through a link the company sends. Loudoun County advises running Virginia licenses through the Department of Professional and Occupational Regulation (DPOR) lookup and reading the complaints and disciplinary actions.

Compare the phone numbers, area codes, and address on the site with the registration record. Treat a decade of claimed history on a domain about 13 months old as false until proven. Demand an in-person meeting or a site visit, and stop the deal at Telegram-only contact or any pushback on identity checks.

On any video call, ask for a hand across the face, a turned head, and a lean back, and treat a refusal as the answer. Silent Push advises reporting a suspected front to the FBI's Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3). A deepfake can carry a stranger through a video call. It cannot produce a license, an office, or a finished building.


Analyst Annex

Evidence status as of November 20, 2026. The records cover The Great House, a fake construction and engineering company on thegreathouse[.]us, and the two video calls Silent Push held with the person running it, published November 19, 2026. Silent Push names no client of the front.

Earlier North Korean front companies and law enforcement actions appear under Related Activity as context only. None was observed in this activity.

Confirmed marks evidence published by a victim, vendor, regulator, or government authority about its own systems, decisions, or investigation. Reported marks technical findings or attribution assessments published by a third party. Claimed marks statements by a seller or self-identified threat actor that remain unverified. Provisional marks an analytical mapping supported by reported behavior but not made by the original source.

Indicators

Indicator Context Status
Domains
thegreathouse[.]us Fake construction and engineering company site, created October 18, 2025, still serving content Source: Silent Push Reported
Other Indicators
devtop0109[@]gmail[.]com Registrant email, on the list of 1,400 addresses attributed to North Korean IT workers, registered thegreathouse[.]us and no other domain Source: Silent Push Reported
t[.]me/thegreathouse19 Telegram account listed on the site and used to set up the calls Source: Silent Push Reported
+1 351-345-0257 Telephone number in the domain registration, Massachusetts area code Source: Silent Push Reported
+14794100717 Telephone link in the page markup, Arkansas area code Source: Silent Push Reported

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Tactic Technique Procedure Status
The Great House Front Company, domain created October 18, 2025
Resource Development T1583.001 Acquire Infrastructure: Domains Registered thegreathouse[.]us on October 18, 2025 for the front company Source: Silent Push, MITRE ATT&CK Reported
Resource Development T1585.002 Establish Accounts: Email Accounts Registered the domain with devtop0109[@]gmail[.]com Source: Silent Push, MITRE ATT&CK Provisional
Resource Development T1585.001 Establish Accounts: Social Media Accounts Listed a LinkedIn company page and the Telegram account thegreathouse19 on the site Source: Silent Push, MITRE ATT&CK Provisional
Stealth T1684.001 Social Engineering: Impersonation Posed as a Lynchburg, Virginia contractor and used real-time deepfake software on the second video call Source: Silent Push, MITRE ATT&CK Provisional

Entities

Entity Role Status
Threat Actors
North Korean Remote Worker (Edward)Front company persona Silent Push confidently assesses the domain is operated by a North Korean remote worker, based on the registrant email and the deepfake Source: Silent Push Reported
FAMOUS CHOLLIMA (aka Jasper Sleet)Nation state adversary Active since at least 2018. CrowdStrike lists Contagious Interview among its identifiers and assesses it likely acts for the Munitions Industry Department Source: CrowdStrike Provisional
Organizations and Victims
The Great HouseFake company Claims a residential and commercial contractor based in Lynchburg, Virginia, with 10+ years in business and 200+ clients Source: Silent Push Reported
Tools and Services
Real-time deepfake softwareFace replacement on video Showed layering artifacts and facial distortion on the second call Source: Silent Push Reported
TelegramMessaging service Contact channel for the front, account thegreathouse19 Source: Silent Push Reported
Organizations and Victims
BWX TechnologiesContext only, Lynchburg nuclear contractor Corporate headquarters and Government Operations Nuclear Operations Group headquarters in Lynchburg. No evidence the front bid on its work Source: BWXT Confirmed
Government Bodies
Munitions Industry DepartmentNorth Korean weapons body Its 313 General Bureau is among the entities dispatching IT workers Source: Treasury Reported

The records below cover earlier North Korean front companies, recruiter lures, and law enforcement actions. None was observed in The Great House activity.

Intelligence Gaps

Gap Why It Matters What Would Close It
Clients reached Silent Push names no client, so whether the front won any contract or payment is unknown A client report, a payment record, or a law enforcement filing naming the front
Link to earlier fronts The attribution rests on one registrant email on a third-party list and the deepfake Infrastructure, accounts, or payment paths shared with earlier FAMOUS CHOLLIMA fronts
Identity and location of Edward Edward is a persona, and the registration lists a New York address against a Virginia claim Connection-origin data or a law enforcement identification
Deepfake tool The software behind the face replacement is not named Analysis of the recorded call identifying the tool
Verification of the email list Silent Push does not say how the third-party list of 1,400 addresses was verified Independent confirmation of the list or of devtop0109[@]gmail[.]com from another source
Bids near sensitive sites Lynchburg hosts a nuclear contractor, and nothing shows whether the front bid near it Client or bid records for The Great House
Other sectors Silent Push covers a single front company, so the reach of the construction pivot is unknown Further front companies found in construction, engineering, or other trades