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Entities collected from this article, grouped for quick reference and copying. Inclusion does not establish malicious activity. Article links appear separately at the bottom as references.

Juan Ricardo Palacio Escobar haggled hard over a ransom his client believed would never be paid. He wrote from Proton Mail, an encrypted email service based in Switzerland. Quoting the victim number from the ransom note, he asked the threat actor for the "lowest possible price for the decryptor." The threat actor answered in Bitcoin (BTC), asking .2BTC, about US$13,000. Palacio talked the figure down to US$6,000, the indictment says.

His firm had already billed the victim US$13,260 to unlock the files with "proprietary decryption tools." The threat actor was the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and so was the victim. A Rhode Island grand jury indicted Palacio on November 18, 2026, on three counts of wire fraud, each carrying up to 20 years in prison. The indictment says his Florida firm sold no-pay decryption for nearly six years while buying keys from threat actors and keeping the markup.

Ransomware recovery firms sell victims a way out of paying criminals, and no client can see whether the firm keeps that promise. Palacio's firm told every website visitor, "Do not pay the ransom!" and handed at least one client a signed certificate saying nobody had negotiated a payment. ProPublica exposed recovery firms paying in secret in 2019, and the practice is still being sold.

Palacio is the second recovery firm leader charged with this fraud in two months, after MonsterCloud owner Zohar Pinhasi, whose case was examined in the analysis of ransomware negotiators working both sides. Every victim relying on a no-pay promise may be funding a threat actor nobody vetted, possibly a sanctioned one, with no record the payment happened. The charges are allegations, unproven until trial.

Operation Timeline

Trace the events, turning points, and connections behind the analysis.

Ransomware Recovery Firm Sting Timeline

Key events from the 2019 exposure of recovery firms paying ransoms to the indictment of Juan Ricardo Palacio Escobar on November 18, 2026.

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  1. May 15, 2019

    ProPublica Exposes Recovery Firms Paying Ransoms

    United States

    ProPublica reports Proven Data Recovery and MonsterCloud paid ransoms while claiming their own recovery methods.

  2. October 2020

    Company A Registered

    Florida

    Company A is registered as a ransomware response company, and the charged scheme begins.

  3. September 21, 2021

    Department of the Treasury Warns Ransom Facilitators

    United States

    The United States Department of the Treasury says incident response firms facilitating ransom payments may risk violating its regulations.

  4. January 20, 2024

    Kansas Victim Ransom Paid

    Kansas

    Palacio pays about US$445,000 in Bitcoin for the key, after the victim paid the firm US$720,000.

  5. April 26, 2025

    Proposal to a Rhode Island Security Company

    Rhode Island

    The firm proposes 354 forensic servers and quotes US$314,150 to recover the data.

  6. April 20, 2026

    Negotiator Pleads Guilty

    United States

    Angelo Martino pleads guilty to conspiring to commit ransomware attacks after feeding BlackCat threat actors client positions.

  7. June 14, 2026

    Palacio Contacts the FBI Persona

    Proton Mail

    Palacio cites the victim identification number and asks for the lowest possible price for the decryptor.

  8. June 16, 2026

    FBI Pays the Firm

    Rhode Island

    The fictitious victim pays US$13,260 for decryption.

  9. June 19, 2026

    Palacio Pays the FBI

    Global

    Palacio pays about .0948BTC, or US$6,003, for the decryption tool.

  10. October 7, 2026

    MonsterCloud Owner Arraigned

    New York

    Zohar Pinhasi is arraigned in the Eastern District of New York on wire fraud charges over the same model.

  11. November 10, 2026

    Magistrate Case Unsealed

    Rhode Island

    Magistrate case 1:26-mj-00046 against Palacio is unsealed, and a defense attorney appears for him.

  12. November 18, 2026

    Palacio Indicted

    Rhode Island

    A grand jury charges Palacio with three counts of wire fraud.

  13. November 19, 2026

    Arrest and Arraignment

    Rhode Island

    The docket lists an arrest and an arraignment for Palacio.

Paying the FBI for a Decryptor

An FBI undercover employee contacted Palacio's firm, which the indictment calls Company A, in June 2026. The agent posed for a fictitious Rhode Island business hit by ransomware, called Company 1. A second bureau employee played the ransomware threat actor online. The FBI encrypted multiple files on a computer owned by Company 1 and left a ransom note with an email address and a unique victim number. Real threat actors leave the same kind of string so each target can name itself when reaching out.

At a first meeting on June 8, Company 1 said paying the ransom was off the table. The firm answered with its standard line, no negotiation with threat actors and no ransom payments, and charged US$2,750 for an initial forensic assessment. On June 10 the firm ran the assessment on Company 1's system through a remote access and support program. The US$2,750 wire to Palacio's account ending in 9746 in Florida became Count 2.

The first contact came on June 14, four days after the assessment. Palacio cited the victim number in the ransom note and asked for the lowest possible price, the indictment says, and the persona proposed .2BTC, worth about US$13,000 at the time. The fake victim still believed the firm would break the encryption itself.

On June 16 both sides signed a contract promising "proprietary decryption tools." Files would come back "in their original structure, naming, and order." Attachment D described "advanced reverse engineering and cryptoanalysis, custom algorithm development, intelligent brute-force and heuristic attacks." The same day Individual 1, the firm's Managing Director of North America, called the diagnostic a success and priced decryption at US$13,260. The FBI wired the full amount to the same Florida account, and that wire became Count 3.

Palacio tried on June 17 to cut the ransom to US$4,000, which the indictment says would have raised the firm's profit, and agreed to US$6,000. Asked where to send the decryption tool, he gave a Google account under the name erickrmiller10, owned and used by Palacio. On June 19 he paid about .0948BTC, US$6,003 at the time, to the FBI persona.

About five days after the FBI handed over the tool, Individual 1 told the fake victim the files were decrypted. The firm took in US$16,010 from the two wires and paid about US$6,000 for the key. Company A kept about US$10,010. The bureau's fictitious business paid about 2.7 times what the key cost, for a decryption bought from the very threat actor the firm swore never to deal with.

Six Years of No-Pay Promises

Company A's website warned of the "serious risks" of paying, saying payment "may expose you to further extortion attempts" and "there is no guarantee attackers will provide working decryption keys." The site credited the firm's experts with proprietary, cryptography-based software. Written proposals promised advanced cryptographic tools to restore all data. Each paid assessment came with a full data recovery guarantee.

The indictment describes five clients who heard that pitch between January 2024 and June 2026. In four cases Palacio paid the ransom the client had been promised would never be paid.

The Kansas company also received a "Recovery Certificate" signed by Individual 1. The certificate said the firm "has never contacted, nor entered negotiations with anyone" about a ransom. The document claimed a success rate above 99 percent and credited "cryptography experts" using "proprietary tools and algorithms." The certificate opens with "As requested," so the victim asked for it, and the indictment does not say why.

Insurers, boards, auditors, and regulators are the parties usually wanting written proof no ransom was paid. Company A's website warned payment "may also violate regulatory or insurance policies." The certificate handed the Kansas company a document for exactly those readers, and prosecutors say its claims were false.

The certificate dates the attack to "the 12th of February." The indictment places the Kansas intrusion around January 11, 2024, and the ransom payment nine days later. Prosecutors leave the gap unexplained. Either the certificate carried a wrong date, or it covered a second incident the indictment does not describe.

Bank Accounts Older Than the Firm

Company A was a Florida limited liability company registered around October 2020 as a ransomware response firm. Palacio co-founded the firm with Individual 1, served as Chief Technology Officer, and appeared as Manager in the Florida business filing. Individual 1 held the title Managing Director of North America. Both men lived in Colombia and traveled often to the United States.

Clients paid into a Citibank account ending in 9746, held in the name of Digital Recovery Group with Palacio as sole signer, the indictment shows. That account opened around June 5, 2019, about 16 months before Company A was registered. Palacio opened a Reputation Up, LLC account ending in 9254 at the same bank around June 19, 2019. A personal Citibank account ending in 8091 followed around August 29.

Two more accounts opened in September 2021, ending in 4792 for Ptolomeo Investments LLC at Citibank and 8226 for Digital Recovery Group at Wells Fargo. Nothing in the charging document explains what Digital Recovery Group did before Company A existed, or whether the 2019 accounts took money from ransomware victims.

The forfeiture allegations reach six Florida properties. Palacio bought a house in Miami Lakes on December 1, 2020, about two months into the charged scheme. Ptolomeo Investments, a Palacio company, bought a Davenport property on October 1, 2021. The same company bought two condominium units on Altara Avenue in Coral Gables on June 1, 2022, and September 1, 2023.

Two more Palacio companies, Titania Investments and Inversiones Tridente Corp., each bought a unit at 1400 Biscayne Boulevard in Miami on August 1, 2026. Those purchases came about six weeks after the sting payment. The grand jury alleges every one of the six purchases was funded in part by proceeds of the scheme, and prosecutors will seek a money judgment covering all fraud losses.

Where the Case Stands

A magistrate case against Palacio, 1:26-mj-00046, opened on November 9 and was unsealed a day later, according to CourtListener. A defense attorney filed an appearance for him the same day. The grand jury returned the indictment eight days later.

The criminal docket lists an arrest and an arraignment on November 19, along with a court order and a notice of forfeiture allegation. The case sits with District Judge Melissa R. DuBose, referred to Magistrate Judge Rebecca L. Aitchison. The docket shows a motion and a response the same day, without public detail.

The indictment names Assistant United States Attorneys Julianne Klein and Lee H. Vilker as signers, with Christen Gallagher, a trial attorney from the United States Department of Justice's Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section. The section's presence brings the department's headquarters cyber crime prosecutors into a case built around a single Rhode Island sting. 404 Media reported the indictment on November 19, 2026, with Court Watch.

Individual 1 signed the Kansas certificate, ran the client conversations, and confirmed the decryption to Company 1. Palacio is the only defendant named in the indictment. The charging document does not say whether Individual 1 is cooperating, under separate charge, or outside the reach of United States courts in Colombia.

A Defense Case and a Sanctions Gap

Paying a ransom is legal in the United States. The United States Department of the Treasury strongly discourages all private companies and citizens from paying, without prohibiting payment. Palacio faces charges for lying to clients about the ransoms, not for paying them. In every payment the indictment describes, Palacio bought a decryption key, and Company 1 got its files back.

Defense counsel could argue a client focused on getting files back paid for a result and received one, with the fee covering the firm's risk and labor. The "As requested" certificate also allows a reading prosecutors will have to address, a client wanting a document more than a fact. Nothing in the indictment says any client knew a ransom was paid.

Company A told clients paying carried regulatory and insurance risk, then paid ransoms in their names without disclosing the payments. Prosecutors can point to those warnings against any claim the clients got what they paid for. The fraud described is the false account of how the data came back, invoices for work never done, and a markup on a ransom nobody agreed to.

Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) warned in a September 21, 2021 advisory that firms facilitating ransom payments for victims, digital forensics and incident response companies included, may risk violating its regulations. OFAC may impose civil penalties on strict liability, even when a person did not know the transaction was prohibited.

The indictment redacts the name of the ransomware threat actor behind the Kansas attack and names none of the threat actors Palacio paid. A recovery firm paying in secret decides who receives the money without the client knowing a payment exists. Sanctions force victims, insurers, negotiators, and payment intermediaries to check whether money reaches a blocked person, as the analysis of Qilin's administrator set out. A client kept in the dark could never run the check.

Seven Years of Recovery Firms Paying in Secret

ProPublica found on May 15, 2019 Proven Data Recovery of Elmsford, New York, regularly paid SamSam hackers. The outlet traced four transfers from Proven Data to the SamSam threat actors in Iran. OFAC had designated two Iranians in November 2018, Ali Khorashadizadeh and Mohammad Ghorbaniyan, for exchanging SamSam ransom payments, and listed two addresses with over 7,000 transactions. A client of Proven Data could have paid a sanctioned address without knowing a ransom existed.

ProPublica also found in 2019 Florida-based MonsterCloud professed to use the firm's own recovery methods and paid ransoms instead. Owner Zohar Pinhasi, also known as Zack Silver and Zack Green, was arraigned on October 7, 2026 in the Eastern District of New York on wire fraud charges. The Justice Department says Pinhasi pitched MonsterCloud as a principled alternative to paying threat actors, citing "proprietary tools." Prosecutors allege he charged clients US$19 million. More than US$8 million of that went to threat actors.

Pinhasi's markup ran higher than Palacio's. In or around August 2023, according to the Pinhasi charges, MonsterCloud paid about US$8,200 to unlock one client's data. The firm billed that client about US$150,000, about 18 times the payment. Palacio's firm billed the Kansas client US$720,000 against a ransom of about US$445,000. The FBI and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) advise victims against paying at all.

Victims refusing to pay on principle are the market a no-pay recovery pitch is built for. Berlin's state government refused to pay VICE SPIDER after a breach. A victim taking that stand and hiring a recovery firm to hold the line could end up paying the same threat actor through a middleman.

What the Firm Knew About the Other Side

Palacio used multiple electronic accounts to negotiate the "best price" for decryption keys, the indictment alleges. Six years of those deals leave contact channels, wallets, and payment records for every ransomware threat actor the firm paid. A crypto address surfacing inside a ransom negotiation can start an investigation, as the analysis of following the money noted.

Whatever records Company A kept are now evidence in a federal case. Those records could show which ransomware threat actors took money from one intermediary, when, and through which wallets. A ransomware-as-a-service operation supplies the negotiation framework every affiliate uses, so an intermediary's records can reach the program itself. The indictment is silent on what investigators recovered, and this value is an inference from the scheme's structure.

Palacio also hid from the threat actors he paid. He negotiated from Proton Mail and took the decryptor at a Google account under the name erickrmiller10, a name other than his own. A middleman concealing himself from both clients and counterparties knew either side could expose him.

Angelo Martino shows how far an intermediary can switch sides. The former negotiator pleaded guilty, the Justice Department announced on April 20, 2026, after giving BlackCat threat actors the bargaining positions and insurance policy limits of five victims he worked for. The indictment does not allege Palacio passed client information to any threat actor. Investigators identified an administrator, a developer, a negotiator, and an affiliate behind KillSec, and a broker trusted by both sides fits inside the same ecosystem.

A No-Pay Promise Nobody Can Check

Three real clients appear in the indictment in detail, plus a fourth known only by its invoices and the FBI's fictitious company. The charged scheme ran from about October 2020 through June 2026. Four of the six properties were bought between December 2020 and September 2023, funded in part by scheme proceeds, before the earliest client payment the indictment describes in January 2024.

I assess with high confidence the scheme reached more victims than the indictment describes, given those early purchases and the bank accounts opened in 2019. I assess with moderate confidence the FBI will run the same sting against other recovery firms, given the bureau built a reusable fake victim and ransomware persona. A superseding indictment naming more victims, or the size of the money judgment, would show how far the first assessment reaches.

The recovery industry has sold the same story since at least 2019, when ProPublica found firms promising high-tech ransomware solutions almost always just paid the hackers. MonsterCloud's owner billed customers US$19 million while paying threat actors, the Justice Department says, and a former negotiator has admitted feeding a threat actor his own clients' bargaining positions. With 93 active ransomware operations in Q2 2026, the most ever recorded, demand for a firm promising a clean way out keeps growing.

Before paying anyone to unlock files, check No More Ransom, the free decryptor library backed by Europol. A firm claiming proprietary decryption for a ransomware family with no free tool and no public flaw should be treated as paying the threat actor until the firm proves otherwise. Contracts can require written disclosure of any contact with the threat actor and any payment made, with the wallet and payee named for a sanctions check.

Insurers and boards should demand payment records, never a signed statement, since the Kansas certificate shows how easily one can be false. Limit a recovery firm's access to what the work needs and monitor every session, because remote support connections are now a route adversaries hijack. Report the attack to the FBI's Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) before choosing a firm.

The only recovery no middleman can fake is a backup the threat actor never reached. CISA advises keeping backups offline and encrypted, and testing them regularly, because many ransomware variants hunt for reachable copies to delete. Osaka Metropolitan University learned the cost when most backups were encrypted along with roughly 500 of the school's servers.

A victim cannot see inside a recovery firm's process, and prosecutors say Palacio's firm sold exactly that blindness. The firm warned clients against paying, took their money, paid on their behalf, and certified the opposite. Any firm claiming to decrypt ransomware without the threat actor's key owes the client proof, and a buyer accepting the claim may be wiring money to the threat actor through a middleman. The FBI checked by becoming the threat actor, and found the firm asking for the lowest possible price.


Analyst Annex

Evidence status as of November 20, 2026. The records cover the indictment of Juan Ricardo Palacio Escobar, filed in the District of Rhode Island on November 18, 2026, and the scheme it alleges from about October 2020 through June 2026. Every allegation is unproven until trial.

The Indicators and MITRE ATT&CK Mapping subsections are omitted. The case is a fraud by a recovery firm, the indictment names no ransomware threat actor or intrusion technique, and the encryption in the sting was carried out by the FBI.

Earlier recovery firm and negotiator cases appear under Related Activity as context only. None was observed in this scheme.

Confirmed marks evidence published by a victim, vendor, regulator, or government authority about its own systems, decisions, or investigation. Reported marks technical findings or attribution assessments published by a third party. Claimed marks statements by a seller or self-identified threat actor that remain unverified. Provisional marks an analytical mapping supported by reported behavior but not made by the original source.

Entities

Entity Role Status
Threat Actors
Juan Ricardo Palacio EscobarDefendant, Chief Technology Officer of Company A Charged with three counts of wire fraud. Allegedly paid ransoms while telling clients the firm never paid Source: Indictment Reported
Individual 1Co-founder of Company A Managing Director of North America. Signed the Recovery Certificate given to the Kansas victim Source: Indictment Reported
Organizations and Victims
Company AFlorida ransomware response company Registered around October 2020. Client payments went to an account held in the name of Digital Recovery Group Source: Indictment Reported
Kansas Software Consulting CompanyVictim Paid US$720,000 after a ransomware attack around January 11, 2024, while Palacio paid about US$445,000 in Bitcoin for the key Source: Indictment Reported
Rhode Island Security CompanyVictim Paid US$1,250 for an assessment in April 2025 and was quoted US$314,150 to recover its data Source: Indictment Reported
Company 1Fictitious victim run by the FBI Paid US$2,750 and US$13,260 in June 2026, while Palacio paid US$6,003 for the decryptor Source: Indictment Reported
Government Bodies
FBILaw enforcement Posed as both the victim and the ransomware threat actor in June 2026 Source: Indictment Reported
US District Court for Rhode IslandCourt Docket lists an arrest and an arraignment on November 19, 2026, the day after the indictment Source: CourtListener Confirmed
Computer Crime and Intellectual Property SectionJustice Department prosecutors A trial attorney from the section signed the indictment Source: Indictment Reported
Office of Foreign Assets ControlSanctions authority Says incident response firms facilitating ransom payments may risk violating its regulations, with strict liability penalties Source: Treasury Confirmed
Tools and Services
Proton MailEmail service Palacio contacted the FBI persona and negotiated the ransom from a Proton Mail account Source: Indictment Reported
Recovery CertificateSigned document Certified the firm never negotiated any ransom for the Kansas victim Source: Indictment Reported

The records below cover earlier recovery firm and negotiator cases. None was observed in the scheme charged against Palacio.

Intelligence Gaps

Gap Why It Matters What Would Close It
Ransomware threat actors paid The indictment names none of them, so whether any payment reached a sanctioned threat actor is unknown Court filings or blockchain tracing identifying the recipients of each payment
Number of victims The scheme ran nearly six years and the indictment describes three real victims A superseding indictment, victim notifications, or the money judgment amount
Certificate date The Recovery Certificate dates the attack to the 12th of February, while the indictment dates it to around January 11, 2024 The certificate itself or trial evidence explaining the dates
Firm identity The indictment calls the firm Company A and names Digital Recovery Group only as an account holder Court filings naming Company A
Detention or release The docket lists an arrest and an arraignment on November 19, 2026, but its public labels do not say whether Palacio is detained The arraignment order or a detention ruling
Earlier magistrate case Magistrate case 1:26-mj-00046 was unsealed on November 10, 2026, and its charging document is not public here The unsealed complaint or warrant in that case
Records of past negotiations Palacio used multiple electronic accounts to negotiate with threat actors, and the indictment does not say what investigators recovered Court filings describing seized accounts or wallet tracing
Individual 1 The co-founder signed the certificate and quoted the sting price but is not charged in this indictment Charges against Individual 1 or a statement of cooperation