Entities

Entities collected from this article, grouped for quick reference and copying. Inclusion does not establish malicious activity. Article links appear separately at the bottom as references.

Resetting an infected Windows machine may no longer clean it. Cisco Talos found the Overlord remote access trojan (RAT) planting itself in the folder Windows reads during Reset this PC, so the reset meant to remove it runs it instead, and killing the process crashes the machine. Talos ties the threat actor behind it, UAT-12643, to North Korea at low confidence, yet every overlap behind that attribution is public code anyone can download. Defenders should rebuild infected machines rather than reset them.

Talos published its analysis on November 18, 2026, and tracks UAT-12643 as a financially motivated threat actor. The threat actor's first files pull down its malware through Microsoft's own command line tools. Alongside Overlord, it runs Good Game, a public Python infostealer, and a cryptocurrency clipboard hijacker. Its lures and the files its stealer hunts for point at gamers, wallet holders, softphone users, and finance staff. Talos bases the North Korea link on overlaps in tactics, techniques, and procedures with known North Korean threat actors.

Operation Timeline

Trace the events, turning points, and connections behind the analysis.

Overlord and UAT-12643 Timeline

Key events from the first MALFEX npm packages in August 2023 to the Talos report on November 18, 2026.

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  1. August 2023

    MALFEX Adversary Starts Publishing

    npm Registry

    What appears to be a single adversary begins publishing to npm. One of its later delivery paths loads Overlord.

  2. March 2026

    Solana Memo Technique First Reported

    Solana Blockchain

    According to Talos, the Solana transaction memo C2 technique is first reported in Lazarus activity, implemented through Node.js.

  3. April to May 2026

    UNK_DeadDrop Phishes Developers

    Global

    A likely North Korean threat actor phishes close to 100 organizations with developer recruitment or code review themes.

  4. June 2026

    UNK_DeadDrop Use of Overlord Reported

    Global

    Researchers report UNK_DeadDrop, which Talos calls likely a North Korean threat actor, using the Overlord RAT in its campaigns.

  5. August 6, 2026

    Jamf Finds Overlord Behind a Fake Zoom Installer

    Global

    Jamf reports Overlord is publicly available on GitHub and ships with a Solana-based C2 resolver. Jamf does not attribute the campaign to a specific threat actor.

  6. October 5, 2026

    Checkmarx Publishes MALFEX

    npm Registry

    Checkmarx describes a loader for Overlord among the MALFEX packages, which have 40,767 recorded downloads.

  7. September 2026

    Talos Finds UAT-12643 Activity

    Europe

    Talos discovers malicious activity by UAT-12643, according to a companion piece Talos published the same day as its main analysis.

  8. November 18, 2026

    Talos Publishes UAT-12643

    Europe

    Talos describes the Overlord RAT surviving Reset this PC through the Windows Recovery Environment and assesses with low confidence the threat actor is North Korea-aligned.

Delivery Through Microsoft Tools

Talos found the threat actor starts infections with Windows shortcut (LNK) files, HTML Application (HTA) files, or MSBuild project files. Each one hands the download to a Microsoft program, so the payload arrives through software Windows already trusts. Talos has not seen how the files reach victims. Nation state and eCrime threat actors alike lean on Microsoft's own tools, and VOODOO BEAR (aka Sandworm) used them to wipe a Ukrainian grain company.

One shortcut poses as a Portable Document Format (PDF) file and calls MpCmdRun.exe, the Microsoft Defender command-line tool, with its -DownloadFile argument. The payload lands as RuntimeBroker.exe, the name of a real Windows process. A second shortcut hides behind a double file extension and fetches its payload with the -URLCache option of certutil, a Windows certificate utility. Talos found both shortcuts were built on the same machine, win-8oa3ccqae4d.

The HTA file runs under mshta.exe, a known proxy for malicious scripts, and writes its payload to %TEMP%\s.exe. The MSBuild file, dl.xml, compiles C# code in memory under msbuild.exe, a trusted developer utility threat actors abuse the same way. Talos found the MSBuild download disguises itself as Windows Update traffic with a spoofed Microsoft BITS/7.8 User-Agent string, the one the Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) sends.

Talos found these files on the threat actor's own server at 41.216.188[.]11, where a Flask file delivery service ran on port 8000. An operational security failure left the server's root folder open to the internet. Inside sat the toolset, the command-and-control (C2) port map, and a script for building the shortcuts. The script takes a payload address and an icon type of PDF, Word, or Windows Update.

A companion piece Talos published the same day dates its discovery of the activity to September 2026, but neither piece says when the campaign began. Exposed staging servers keep handing researchers whole toolkits, as one did when Gambit Security cracked the server behind a card-theft campaign.

Surviving Removal and Reset

Talos found Overlord first checks for administrative rights and enables SeDebugPrivilege. It then calls NtSetInformationProcess directly to mark itself as a critical process, so Windows treats it like one of its own core system processes. If a user or security tool forcibly ends it, Windows crashes with a Blue Screen of Death (BSoD) and the stop code CRITICAL_PROCESS_DIED.

Overlord persists first through a registry Run key under the current user. Its second method targets the Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE). Overlord writes a copy of itself under a random 20-character name into %TARGETOSDRIVE%\Recovery\OEM\, the folder WinRE reads during Reset this PC. Talos says the %TARGETOSDRIVE% variable in that path resolves only inside WinRE, so the payload is built to launch at recovery time and nowhere else.

Microsoft built the folder for manufacturers. Its documentation lets them add scripts to run when a user picks either reset option, Keep my files or Remove everything. Overlord abuses the same feature, so either option runs the implant.

Overlord next backs up ResetConfig.xml, the file telling WinRE what to run during a reset. Talos says it then patches the file, or creates one if none exists, to register its batch script as an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) task. From then on, a reset started from Settings or from the recovery boot menu runs the RAT before Windows is restored.

Talos claims the implant survives, but its analysis stops at the RAT launching inside WinRE. It never shows the RAT being copied into the rebuilt Windows, and Microsoft's own sample scripts set %TARGETOSDRIVE% themselves from the registry. Until someone shows that step, do not trust a reset to clean an infected machine. Rebuild it from clean installation media.

Overlord finds its C2 server through a dead drop resolver on the Solana blockchain. Talos found the threat actor writes encrypted server addresses into blockchain transactions through the Solana Memo Program, which permanently records up to 566 bytes of arbitrary text in a transaction. To move servers, the threat actor posts one new transaction from a wallet it controls. Every deployed RAT picks up the new address the next time it checks, with no update to the implant.

To find the address, Talos found, the RAT requests the wallet's transactions newest first through the Solana getSignatures JavaScript Object Notation remote procedure call (JSON-RPC) method and reads each one in full. It ignores every memo except one exactly 43 characters long, the fixed length of its encrypted WebSocket address.

The memo format gives defenders little to block. Checkmarx notes taking down one server leaves the addressing scheme intact, since the next address sits in a public ledger no abuse report can edit.

What UAT-12643 Steals

Talos counts 35 commands in Overlord. They cover keystroke capture, webcam streaming, microphone and desktop audio capture, and screen capture. Others handle files and processes and run arbitrary commands and scripts. A reverse proxy tunnel routes the threat actor's traffic through the victim network to internal hosts the internet cannot reach. Plugins load straight into memory, so new capabilities arrive without a new file on disk.

Good Game is a publicly available Python stealer, and Talos says the threat actor is not its developer. It targets 23 Chromium-family and Firefox-based browser variants and 21 cryptocurrency wallets. It steals Discord tokens and Roblox session cookies and tests each one against the service's application programming interface (API) to confirm it still works. It also takes session data from Steam, Riot Games, Epic Games, and Rockstar Games launchers.

Before collecting anything, Good Game quits if it sees signs of a sandbox, Talos notes. The checks include a virtualization network adapter, less than two gigabytes of memory, and less than five minutes of uptime.

The stealer then copies only files with one of 45 allowed extensions and a name matching keywords in English, French, Spanish, or Portuguese. The keywords look for seed phrases, private keys, and password files. They also cover banking terms, two-factor backup codes, and Telegram sessions. Talos reads the four languages as a sign of potential victims in Europe.

The lures point at specific jobs. A decoy financial statement opens when Good Game runs, which Talos reads as targeting finance and accounting staff. A trojanized Viber installer goes after messaging users. Payloads named microsip, after the MicroSIP softphone for Windows, point at Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) softphone users in call centers and business telephone environments.

The clipboard hijacker needs no network at all. It is a small C++ program carrying the threat actor's wallet addresses encrypted inside the binary. It polls the clipboard every 500 milliseconds and swaps any copied cryptocurrency address for the threat actor's own. It persists as %APPDATA%\MsgEdgeUpdate.exe under a Run key value named MsgEdgeUpdate, posing as a Microsoft Edge updater.

Talos reports stolen data never touches the C2 server. Good Game uploads its archive to the GoFile file-sharing service and posts a Discord webhook message with the victim's machine profile and a one-click download link. The threat actor gets a preview of each victim before deciding whether to download the archive.

Talos's case for North Korea rests on one tool and one technique, and its analysis names no other overlap. UNK_DeadDrop, an activity cluster the researchers call likely North Korean, used Overlord in campaigns reported in June 2026. Talos says the Solana memo technique first appeared in Lazarus activity reported in March 2026, written in Node.js. The researchers also note other threat actors use both Overlord and the technique.

Both overlaps come with the public code. Jamf describes Overlord as publicly available on GitHub, with a Solana-based C2 resolver built in. Any threat actor downloading the code gets the technique Talos counts as an overlap. Three explanations fit the published evidence.

Hypothesis 1, North Korea-Aligned Revenue Collection

The UNK_DeadDrop overlap is the strongest evidence for North Korea. Proofpoint documented UNK_DeadDrop in June. Between April and May 2026, it saw a likely North Korean threat actor phish close to 100 organizations with developer recruitment and code review lures. UAT-12643 ran its Overlord C2 on port 5173, and UNK_DeadDrop's build connected to the same port. Proofpoint describes Overlord as an open-source Go framework, though, and names the GitHub project the code comes from.

The cryptocurrency focus fits North Korea too. My earlier analysis of North Korean activity found much of the observed collection is financial, involving wallets and credentials useful for theft. North Korea stole US$6.3 billion from Binance, the FBI named it as the thief, and it still holds around US$3 billion of the proceeds. The Justice Department has won court authority over US$1.2 billion of the stolen funds.

CrowdStrike splits what others call Lazarus into three distinct adversaries, and Talos says only that Lazarus used the Solana technique, not which of the three. CrowdStrike has since split LABYRINTH CHOLLIMA further, and the resulting GOLDEN CHOLLIMA is the earner, working cryptocurrency and fintech targets. CrowdStrike also tracks the FudModule rootkit with core LABYRINTH CHOLLIMA, yet GOLDEN CHOLLIMA has used it too. North Korean units share tools, so a shared tool alone cannot name the unit.

North Korean threat actors do go after individuals. Microsoft found LABYRINTH CHOLLIMA (aka Moonstone Sleet) targeting both individuals and organizations, partly through a fully functional malicious tank game pitched by a fake game developer seeking investment. Kaspersky traced the same game to Lazarus after a Manuscrypt infection on the personal computer of a person in Russia on May 13, 2024, and says Lazarus rarely attacks individuals.

Unit 42's Contagious Interview campaign lures software developers into installing malware through fake job interviews, and Unit 42 puts its likely objective as cryptocurrency theft. Public tools would also give a state-aligned threat actor deniability, since nothing in a borrowed stealer identifies who deployed it.

Against it, the Talos analysis shows no infrastructure, wallet, or code tied to a named North Korean adversary. The individuals in these North Korean campaigns were developers and cryptocurrency investors. None of them went after Roblox players, Steam users, or call-center softphone users, the people Good Game and the lures here aim at.

Hypothesis 2, eCrime Actor Using Public Tools

A financially motivated eCrime threat actor would explain the same evidence without a state behind it. The framework is free, the Solana resolver comes with it, and the stealer is public. Talos found the targets are gamers, Discord and Roblox users, VoIP softphone users, and finance staff, a broad commodity mix. Port 5173 also shows up in the build Jamf found behind a fake Zoom installer, a campaign Jamf does not attribute to a specific threat actor.

Blockchain dead drops started in eCrime. Talos's companion piece credits UNC5142, a financially motivated threat actor behind the ClearFake campaign, with pioneering EtherHiding, which hides C2 addresses in smart contracts. UNC5142 moved there after cloud vendors disrupted its infrastructure. State-sponsored threat actors followed that success, among them the North Korean activity cluster behind Contagious Interview. The Solana memo variant Talos ties to Lazarus came later, in March 2026.

The Hacker News reports Overlord in a third campaign as well, one exploiting WordPress flaws. A shared port fits a common Overlord setup as well as it fits a single threat actor. My earlier analysis of attribution treated victimology as one of the strongest signals, harder to fake at scale than a hash. It also warned a reused tool can be a shared tool. Against it, North Korea's financially motivated adversaries steal cryptocurrency too, and they have targeted individuals as well as organizations.

Hypothesis 3, the MALFEX Adversary

MALFEX is the one named candidate running the same RAT. Checkmarx traced the campaign to what appears to be a single adversary publishing to the npm registry since August 2023. Eight of its twelve packages are malicious, and they drew 40,767 recorded downloads. The packages infect Windows through three paths, a loader for Overlord, an attack chain installing the movinlike Node.js stealer, or a long-running downloader.

The overlaps go beyond Overlord. The Hacker News reports CloudSEK's finding the MALFEX adversary is Portuguese-speaking, with git commits at -0300 and a common Brazilian handle, and Portuguese is one of the four languages in Good Game's keyword list. Movinlike targets Discord, browsers, Telegram, and cryptocurrency wallets, the same ground Good Game covers. Checkmarx found the same Solana memo reader in the MALFEX build of Overlord.

The case against it starts with delivery. Checkmarx found MALFEX spreads through npm packages, while Talos found UAT-12643 uses shortcut, HTA, and MSBuild files. Its stealer runs on Node.js, while Good Game is a public Python tool someone else wrote. The MALFEX build had no Solana address configured, and no source ties the two to shared infrastructure. Stealers on package registries are common, from a hijacked Rust crate in August to Microsoft's agent-framework package on November 17.

Every overlap behind Hypothesis 1 is public code, and the North Korean campaigns aimed at individuals went after developers and cryptocurrency investors, not the gamers and softphone users Good Game hunts. Hypothesis 3 shares a language and a stealer target list with UAT-12643, but no delivery method or infrastructure. I assess with moderate confidence the published evidence does not separate UAT-12643 from eCrime threat actors running the same public tools, and Hypothesis 2 fits best.

Talos was right to hold its own judgment at low confidence, and Hypothesis 3 stands at low confidence as well. Infrastructure, wallet, or code overlap with a named North Korean adversary would change my assessment, and so would a Solana wallet history tying these memos to a known North Korean campaign. Shared infrastructure with a MALFEX build would lift Hypothesis 3.

What Defenders Can Check

The reset persistence lives in one folder, which Microsoft documents at C:\Recovery\OEM on a running system. Files with random 20-character names there, and a ResetConfig.xml registering unfamiliar batch scripts, mark this implant. Check for both on any machine where Overlord turns up, before anyone runs a reset.

Watch for MpCmdRun.exe running with -DownloadFile, certutil fetching files, msbuild.exe compiling a project named dl.xml, and mshta.exe writing executables to %TEMP%. The Run key values Zoipers and MsgEdgeUpdate mark Good Game and the clipboard hijacker.

On the network, the Solana lookups and GoFile uploads Talos describes stand out on machines with no business use for either. In the companion piece, Talos urged defenders to monitor anomalous outbound JSON-RPC traffic instead of relying on domain blocklists. Discord webhook traffic from finance workstations deserves the same scrutiny. The researchers publish the full indicator set in its GitHub repository.

UAT-12643 pairs one new trick with a toolkit anyone can download. The reset persistence is the part to act on today, because it turns the standard fix for a misbehaving machine into a launcher for the implant. Readers seeing the North Korea label should weigh it at the low confidence Talos gave it, since the evidence behind it so far is a free framework, a feature built into that framework, and a stealer someone else wrote.


Analyst Annex

Evidence status as of November 19, 2026. The records cover the UAT-12643 campaign Cisco Talos published on November 18, 2026, including its Overlord RAT variant, the Good Game stealer, the clipboard hijacker, and the exposed staging server. Talos has not published how the initial files reach victims.

The indicators below are a selection from the Talos report. Talos publishes the full set in its GitHub repository.

UNK_DeadDrop, MALFEX, and the fake Zoom installer campaign appear under Related Activity as context for the attribution question, and their records stay separate from UAT-12643.

The Windows Recovery Environment persistence has no matching ATT&CK technique in the mapping below and is described in the Entities and Intelligence Gaps tables instead.

Confirmed marks evidence published by a victim, vendor, regulator, or government authority about its own systems, decisions, or investigation. Reported marks technical findings or attribution assessments published by a third party. Claimed marks statements by a seller or self-identified threat actor that remain unverified. Provisional marks an analytical mapping supported by reported behavior but not made by the original source.

Indicators

Indicator Context Status
IP Addresses
41.216.188[.]11 Staging server running a Flask file delivery service on port 8000. Overlord C2 on port 5173, stealer C2 on ports 5656 and 5959 Source: Cisco Talos Reported
File Names and Paths
RuntimeBroker.exe Payload name used by the LNK file abusing MpCmdRun.exe Source: Cisco Talos Reported
%TEMP%\s.exe Payload written by the HTA dropper Source: Cisco Talos Reported
dl.xml MSBuild project file compiling and running C# in memory Source: Cisco Talos Reported
%TARGETOSDRIVE%\Recovery\OEM\ WinRE folder holding the Overlord copy under a random 20-character name Source: Cisco Talos Reported
ResetConfig.xml WinRE reset configuration patched or created to register the batch script Source: Cisco Talos Reported
%APPDATA%\MsgEdgeUpdate.exe Clipboard hijacker copy Source: Cisco Talos Reported
SK_ Prefix of the Good Game archive name, followed by eight random characters Source: Cisco Talos Reported
Other Indicators
Zoipers Run key value name used by Good Game Source: Cisco Talos Reported
MsgEdgeUpdate Run key value name used by the clipboard hijacker Source: Cisco Talos Reported
UuuRjinBZPBMIjnc Global mutex created by the clipboard hijacker Source: Cisco Talos Reported
win-8oa3ccqae4d Machine name on which both LNK files were built Source: Cisco Talos Reported
Microsoft BITS/7.8 Spoofed User-Agent string used by the MSBuild downloader Source: Cisco Talos Reported

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Tactic Technique Procedure Status
UAT-12643 Campaign, reported November 18, 2026
Execution T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File LNK, HTA, and MSBuild files execute embedded instructions to fetch the payload. The delivery method is not known Source: Cisco Talos, MITRE ATT&CK Reported
Stealth T1036.007 Masquerading: Double File Extension One LNK file poses as a PDF through a double-extension file name and the Microsoft Edge PDF icon Source: Cisco Talos, MITRE ATT&CK Reported
Stealth T1218.005 System Binary Proxy Execution: Mshta The HTA file runs under mshta.exe and writes the payload to %TEMP%\s.exe Source: Cisco Talos, MITRE ATT&CK Reported
Stealth T1127.001 Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution: MSBuild dl.xml compiles and runs C# code in memory under msbuild.exe Source: Cisco Talos, MITRE ATT&CK Reported
Command and Control T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer LNK files download the payload through MpCmdRun.exe -DownloadFile and certutil Source: Cisco Talos, MITRE ATT&CK Reported
Persistence T1547.001 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder Overlord uses a current-user registry autorun entry. Good Game writes the Run value Zoipers and copies itself to the Startup folder. The clipboard hijacker writes the Run value MsgEdgeUpdate Source: Cisco Talos, MITRE ATT&CK Reported
Command and Control T1102.001 Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver Overlord reads encrypted C2 addresses from Solana Memo Program transactions, keeping only 43-character instructions Source: Cisco Talos, MITRE ATT&CK Provisional
Command and Control T1090 Proxy Overlord opens a reverse SOCKS proxy tunnel through the victim network to internal hosts Source: Cisco Talos, MITRE ATT&CK Provisional
Stealth T1620 Reflective Code Loading Overlord loads plugins by reflective DLL injection entirely in memory Source: Cisco Talos, MITRE ATT&CK Provisional
Stealth T1497.001 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks Good Game exits on virtualization MAC prefixes, under two gigabytes of RAM, or under five minutes of uptime. The clipboard hijacker checks the machine name for VBOX, VMWARE, QEMU, and SANDBOX Source: Cisco Talos, MITRE ATT&CK Provisional
Collection T1056.001 Input Capture: Keylogging Overlord captures keystrokes using GetAsyncKeyState Source: Cisco Talos, MITRE ATT&CK Provisional
Collection T1113 Screen Capture Overlord captures the desktop screen Source: Cisco Talos, MITRE ATT&CK Provisional
Credential Access T1555.003 Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers Good Game targets 23 Chromium-family and Firefox-based browser variants Source: Cisco Talos, MITRE ATT&CK Provisional
Collection T1115 Clipboard Data The clipboard hijacker polls the clipboard every 500 milliseconds and overwrites copied wallet addresses Source: Cisco Talos, MITRE ATT&CK Provisional
Exfiltration T1567.002 Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage Good Game uploads its archive to GoFile Source: Cisco Talos, MITRE ATT&CK Provisional
Exfiltration T1567.004 Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration Over Webhook Good Game posts the victim profile and download link to a Discord webhook Source: Cisco Talos, MITRE ATT&CK Provisional

Entities

Entity Role Status
Threat Actors
UAT-12643Financially motivated threat actor Talos assesses with low confidence the threat actor is North Korea-aligned, based on overlaps in tactics, techniques, and procedures Source: Cisco Talos Reported
Organizations and Victims
Potential VictimsCryptocurrency holders, gaming platform account owners, and VoIP software users Talos says the threat actor is potentially targeting victims in Europe, based on file harvesting keyed to English, French, Spanish, and Portuguese file names Source: Cisco Talos Reported
Tools and Services
OverlordGo-based RAT Marks itself a critical process so forced termination triggers CRITICAL_PROCESS_DIED. Persists through the WinRE OEM folder so Reset this PC runs it before restoring Windows. 35 commands Source: Cisco Talos Reported
Good GamePython infostealer Publicly available stealer the threat actor did not develop. Targets browsers, Discord, Roblox, 21 cryptocurrency wallets, and four gaming launchers Source: Cisco Talos Reported
Clipboard HijackerC++ Windows x64 executable Swaps copied cryptocurrency addresses for the threat actor’s wallets, with no network component Source: Cisco Talos Reported
Solana Memo ProgramAbused blockchain service Carries the encrypted C2 addresses Overlord reads Source: Cisco Talos Reported
GoFileAbused file-sharing service Receives the Good Game archive Source: Cisco Talos Reported
DiscordAbused messaging service Webhook receives each victim profile and the download link Source: Cisco Talos Reported
Push-Button Reset ExtensibilityAbused Windows feature Microsoft lets manufacturers place scripts and ResetConfig.xml in C:\Recovery\OEM to run during Keep my files and Remove everything Source: Microsoft Confirmed

The records below cover other users of Overlord, the North Korean activity Talos compares UAT-12643 against, abuse of Microsoft tooling, an exposed staging server in another campaign, and recent stealer attacks through package registries. None was observed in the UAT-12643 campaign.

Intelligence Gaps

Gap Why It Matters What Would Close It
Campaign start date Talos found the activity in September 2026 but gives no date for when the campaign began, so the window of exposure is unknown Talos telemetry dates or first-seen dates for the published samples
Initial delivery Talos has not observed how the LNK, HTA, and MSBuild files reach victims, so the lure channel and first targeting step are unknown Email, message, or download telemetry tied to the recovered files
Attribution basis Talos rests its low-confidence North Korea link on Overlord and the Solana technique, both public and used by other threat actors Infrastructure, wallet, or code overlap specific to a named North Korean adversary
Solana wallet The wallet holding the C2 memos would show when the threat actor rotated servers and whether other campaigns read from it Publication of the wallet address and its memo history
Actual victims Talos infers targets from lure names and keyword lists and names no confirmed victim Incident response cases or Discord webhook takedown data
Reset survival mechanism Talos shows the RAT launching inside WinRE during a reset but not the step placing it back into the rebuilt Windows The full batch script and a test reset on an infected machine
WinRE persistence prevalence Talos says the Reset this PC technique survives a full system reset, and no source counts how many machines carry it Endpoint scans of Recovery\OEM folders and ResetConfig.xml changes